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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MAURICE W. SMITH and ANITA L.
SMITH, his wife,

)
) ".

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
)

Case No. 14163

v.
MRS. BETH PEARMAIN, BARRY D.
JOHNSON, and HEARTLAND REALTORS,
a Utah corporation,

)
. ' • . .

)

'

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Based on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation,
plaintiffs sued defendant for rescission of their contract
for the purchase of certain real property and for damages.
Defendant counterclaimed for damages resulting from plaintiffs1
failure to perform their obligations under an assignment of
contract and requested the court to foreclose plaintiffs'
interest in said contract and the property described therein.
Defendants Barry D. Johnson and Heartland Realtors, a Utah
corporation, were dismissed on their own motions by the lower
court.

All references herein to defendant and appellant apply

to the sole defendant remaining in the case, Beth Pearmain.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted rescission of the contract and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the total sum of
$13,058.76 and judgment of no cause of action with respect
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to defendant's counterclaim.

*

•..;.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the
lower court reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant
and further relief as appears equitable to the Court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The property which is the subject of the present dispute
is located at 1131 Wilson Avenue in Salt Lake City.

(R.22)

In the year 1930 the owner of the property, a Mr. N. P.
Nielson, petitioned the City Board of Adjustment for a variance
from the terms of the zoning ordinance so as to permit the
erection of a brick radio parts building at the rear of the
lot, replacing an old frame barn and chicken coop then being
used to produce radio parts, in a section of the city zoned
as residential "A" which did not permit shops.
R.104-1G5)

(Exhibit 34-D;

,

In approving Mr. Nielson0s petition, the Board of Adjustment found that an "unnecessary" hardship would be suffered
by the petitioner if restrained from building as contemplated
and that the "spirit of the ordinance" would be upheld and
substantial justice done by granting the variance, providing
the building was restricted to one story and basement occupying
24 X 30 feet as indicated in the plan filed with the petition.
The Board specifically ruled as follows:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be granted;
that the order and decision of the Chief Building
Inspector be reversed and that said officer is hereby
2
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directed to issue permit in accordance with the order
and decision of this Board, building to be not more
[than] 24 X 30 feet and restricted to 1 story and
basement in height." (Exhibit 34-D)(Emphasis added)
No other restrictions were placed on the use of the property
in addition to those stated above.

(Exhibit 34-D)

At the time his petition was granted, Mr. Nielson was
not living on the property.

(Exhibit 34-D; R.95)

There

was, however, a residence on the front part of the lot
which was apparently being rented out.

(Exhibit 34-D)

In 1942 a Mr. Roestenburg, who had purchased the
property, petitioned the City for a variance from the
zoning ordinance for the privilege of building an addition
to an accessory building, including a double garage with
office and filing cabinets in the upstairs, which would be
16 1/2 feet or 1 1/2 feet higher than previously allowed
by the Board.

(Exhibit 35-D) At that time Mr. Roestenburg

was using the already existent shop to produce tools of
war.

(Exhibit 35-D)

The Boavd granted Mr. Roestenburg1s

petition in accordance with the plan submitted, as an
extension of the former variance granted under Case No. 230.
(Exhibit 35-D)

The Board noted in its decision that the

petitioner would suffer unnecessary hardship from a denial
of the variance and that the spirit of the zoning ordinance
would be best upheld and substantial justice done by
granting the variance as an extension of the former variance.
(Exhibit 35-D)

The specific order of the Board is as follows:

.: 3
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"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the variance be granted
in accordance with the plan submitted and as an
extension of former variance granted under Case No.
230; that the order and decision of the Chief Building
Inspector be and the same is hereby reversed and said
officer is hereby directed to issue permit in
accordance with the order and decision of this Board
providing permit is applied for within six months
after the signing of this order." (Exhibit 35-D)
Again, no other restrictions or conditions were placed on
the use of the property except those clearly stated above.
(Exhibit 35-D)

The Board's order states nothing with

respect to occupancy of the residence, operation of the
shop or number of employees permitted.

(Exhibit 35-D)

When Mrs. Pearmain, Defendant and Appellant herein,
moved into the neighborhood at 1137 Wilson Avenue in 1950,
Mr. Roestenburg was on a mission and his shop was being
rented out to a heating or sheet metal company.

(R.lll)

The residence was being occupied by two separate parties
as a duplex (R.109) pursuant to R-2 zoning which permitted
two-family dwellings.

(Exhibit 35-D; R.29)

About three months after Mrs. Pearmain moved into
number 1137 Wilson Avenue, Mr. Roestenburg returned from
his mission and resumed using the rear facilities of his
property as a machine shop (R.lll); however, he operated
the shop as an absentee owner and continued to rent out the
duplex for approximately 21 years.

(R.233)

The testimony

below established that the residence had always been used
as a duplex during the entire 25-year period Mrs. Pearmain
had lived in the neighborhood and that it has been occupied
. ' 4
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by many people during that period.

(R.17)

Mrs. Pearmain purchased the property at 1131 Wilson
Avenue from Mr. and Mrs. Roestenburg in August, 1971, on
a uniform real estate contract.

(R.226; R.176)

That

contract provided that Mr. Roestenburg could continue to
use the machine shop at the rear of the property so long
as he was capable of doing so.

(R.176)

He continued to

use the shop and garage pursuant to the contract provision
until his death, at which time Mrs. Pearmain rented out the
garage at $50.00 a month to her sons for the purpose of
storing two dragster racing cars (R.20,28); and the machine
shop was rented out to an ornamental light company (R.226)
which assembled, painted and stored ornamental light
fixtures.

(R.62,63)

In December, 1972, Mrs. Pearmain, being a widow and
desiring to dispose of the property at 1131 Wilson (R.26),
listed it for sale through Heartland Realty (Exhibit 11-D;
12-P) with Mr. Barry Johnson as listing salesman.
12-P)

(Exhibit

The property was advertised in the Deseret News

under the rental income column as "Duplex with Shops near
Westminster College."

(Exhibit 11-D)

Mr. Smith, Plaintiff and Respondent herein, a resident
of California, saw the ad in the News and called Mr. Johnson
to inquire.

(R.22-23)

According to Mr. Smith's testimony,

he was informed by Mr, Johnson that the shops were being
utilized under a 1945 non-conforming use permit which would
5
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be invalid if the property were vacant for a year and a day
and that it was zoned R-2 which permitted a duplex.

(R.25)

He also testified that Mr. Johnson told him that the shops
could be utilized for light manufacturing and that there
were a variety of businesses that would be interested in
utilizing such a facility.

(R.25)

On April 7, 1973, Mr. Smith personally inspected the
property (R.27), including the basement, the machine shop
and one of the apartments.

(R.28)

There were three or

four individuals working in the machine shop, painting and
storing ornamental light standards, on the day of inspection.
(R.62-63)
Subsequent to his inspection, Mr. Smith entered into
a contract with Mrs. Pearmain for the purchase of the
property and took possession on June 1, 1973.

(Exhibits

2-P, 4-P, 5-P, 6-P)
In the early part of February, 1974, Mrs. Pearmain
received a letter from Smiths8 attorney, advising her that
Smith intended to rescind the contract for the reason that,
since his purchase^ the City had ordered him to vacate the
rear building and to cease from manufacturing activities
on the property for the reason that such activities were
illegal.

(Exhibit 14-P)

The record fails to disclose how the question of the
property's use came before the City.

There is some evidence

that it may have been the result of a complaint from the
6
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neighbors in protest to the building of a boat in the
driveway by one of the tenants.

(Exhiit 10-P)

On the other hand, the matter may have come before the
City in the form of an application of some sort initiated
by Mr. Smith.

Although no such application is a part of

the record, some reference to an application is made in the
City's findings.

(Exhibit 10-P)

There is no evidence in the record of any official
written communication from the City until August 15, 1973.
(Exhibit 35-D)

That communication is in the form of a

letter (Exhibit 20-P; 35-D) from the City Planning Director
to Mr. Smith in apparent response to an earlier letter
from Mr. Smith dated July 23, 1973, wherein Mr. Smith had
inquired about the permissible uses of the property.
(Exhibit 21-P)

The City Planning Director advised as

follows:
"In answering your questions, it is our opinion that
the tenant for the commercial building would have to
live in the residential building in front and that the
building in the rear would be limited to a one-man
machine shop with no welding or repair work of any
type.
"I would assume that the Board of Adjustment would
have jurisdiction in this matter and could elaborate
on this use provided there were no additional employees
involved.

"If there is any other i»formation we can provide,
please contact usT" flxhlbit 20-P)(Emphasis added)
The next official written communication from the City
7
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which is a matter of record is a letter from the Board of
Adjustment to Mr. Smith, dated December 17, 1973, advising
him of the Board's decision that the use of the property
is illegal and must be vacated,

(Exhibit 10-P)

Attached

to the letter are the findings and order of the Board
wherein the Board ordered as follows:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Board sustain the
administrative decision that this is an illegal use
and that the property be vacated; that the Board
feels the intent was for a family-operated business
and the use now has changed and is, therefore, in
violation and in any event the present usage of the
property is a substantial enlargement from the original
variance and no parking facilities have been provided
and such a change of use is beyond the original
varianceo"
There is no evidence in the record of any written
decision from the Planning Director or the Chief Building
Inspector or any other City official prior to the decision
of the Board of Adjustment which is marked Exhibit 10-P.
No reference was made iii rhe letter marked Exhibit
20-P to any decision on the part of the Director or the
Board ordering that the property be vacated or that the use
be changed.
Without appealing from the decision of the Board,
Smiths, Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, commenced this
action in February of 1974 wherein they alleged that
defendant and defendant's agent made certain false and
misleading statements which induced them to enter into a
contract for the purchase of said property.

Plaintiffs

8
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g@\ifht f©£ rdieiision of said eontiraet and damag#§. fh@
low©* e©\H?t £\altd in fchtir favor and htne© this appeAl.
ARGUMENT
fOINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT IELQW TO
FIND THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, SUCH THAT
WOULD ENTITLE PLAINTIFFS TO RESCIND THEIR CONTRACT.
A.

Essential Elements of Fraud Action.
wmttmmmmM i w

n w

» m——uwnwm'

i mi <n» i if"<«»>mm« ^tmmm»mM.ammum'
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This Court in the case of Pace v» Parrlih, 122 Utah
141, 247 P,2d 273 (1952) , held that a plaintiff has the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence all of
the following essential elements in order to recover on
the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations:
"These ares (1) That a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a)
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing
the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage•"
Plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence all of the above listed elements and
it was therefore error for the court to allow rescission•
Specifically, one of the questions presented to the
court on appeal is whether defendant made a representation
concerning a presently existing material fact which was
false*

Defendant submits that this question must be

9
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\

answered in the negative for the following reasons:
1.

According to Mr. Smith's testimony, Mr. Johnson,

the salesman, made the statement to him that the machine
shop and garage were being utilized under a 1945 nonconforming use permit.
2.

(Exhibit 11-D; R.25)

Assuming such statement was in fact made by Mr.

Johnson, plaintiffs have failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it was false at the time it was
made.
3.

Plaintiffs base their entire case on the faulty

reasoning that, because the Board of Adjustment ultimately
decided that the present use was illegal, the prior statements of Mr. Johnson were false.
4.

The better reasoned authority is that a subsequent

legal decision adverse to a statement or representation
previously expressed as to the law cannot establish prior
fraud.

37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §73, p.116 (2d

ed. 1968)

37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §184 (2d ed.

1968) further states the law as follows:
"Except where it may be regarded as continuing in
character, the truth or falsity of a representation
is generally to be determined as of the time it was
made, and subsequent changes do not affect the
liability of the person who made it."
5.

Furthermore, representations or statements

concerning domestic law are not ordinarily regarded as
representations of fact, but rather expressions of opinion
10
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on which no action in fraud will lie, even though they are
false,

37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §73, p.113 (2d

ed. 1968) Accord, Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185
P.2d 264 (1947); Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Company,
86 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 623 (1932).

See, also, 37 AM. JUR. 2d,

Fraud and Deceit, §§45,73 (2d ed. 1968), for proposition
that the above rule extends to representations as to what
the law requires to be done, and representations as to what
the law will not permit to be done, especially when the
representations are made by the avowed agent of the adverse
interest, or when there is no confidential relationship
between the parties.

See 37 AM. JUR. 2d, supra, §74: The

principal of non-responsibility for misrepresentations of
law has been applied to false representation by a vendor
of land as to a matter of law relating to his rights in
and to the land.
B.

Application of Law to Facts.

Mr. Johnson's alleged statement that the shop was
being operated under a 194 5 non-conforming use permit is
an entirely reasonable and valid opinion and interpretation
of the use that was originally granted in 1930.and later
enlarged in 1942.
The original variance was granted for the erection of
a radio parts building.

It was later expanded in 1942 to

permit the construction of an addition to the shop. At
that time the premises were being used to manufacture
11
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tools for war.
It is interesting to note that both in 1930 and 1942
the respective owners were petitioning the City for approval
to construct a new building or addition to an already
existing building.

It is apparent from examining the file

on each case (Exhibits 34-D and 35-D) that the owner was
already using the premises to manufacture, in one case
radio parts, and in the other case tools of war prior to
the filing of their respective petitions.
In both of these instances the Board had adopted a
very liberal approach and interpretation of the zoning
ordinance and variance, finding in each case that "the
spirit of the ordinance will be upheld and substantial
justice done" by granting, extending and expanding the
variance.
The testimony is to the effect that in the last 25
years the same shop and premises has been used as a machine
shop for some type of manufacturing.

(R. 21,111)

It is

possible that Mr,, F" stenbux j ceased manufacturing tools
of war some time subsequent to 1945; however, the testimony
offered at trial established that he continued to use the
shop as a machine shop.

(R.21,111)

In his absence the

shop was utilized by a heating or sheet metal company.
(R.lll)
The Board of Adjustment in 1973 stated its opinion
that the previous Board "assumed it would be a family12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operated business when they granted the variance."

The

Board takes great liberty by stating such an opinion.

Not

only was the first variance in 1930 granted to an absentee
owner (one who did not occupy the residence on the front
of the lot), but there is no evidence^ whatsoever, that any
"family-operated" business was involved.

(Exhibit 34-D)

The court below acknowledged that there was no
limitation in the 1930 decision with respect to ownership
or occupancy of the house along with the new structure.
(R.116)
Neither is there any evidence in 1942 of a "familyoperated" business.

In that case the Board took note of

the fact that a variance had been granted in 1930; that
the petitioner had now increased the business and was
making tools of war industry; that a Mr. Beatty, father-inlaw, who was owner of adajcent property, had deeded 4 1/2
feet to petitioner in order that he might build a double
garage 20 X 20 feet with office and filing cabinet space
upstairs and that this would be an extension of the old
variance.

Nov/ it is certainly far fetched for the Board

to Conclude that a "family business" was being conducted,
merely by virtue of the fact that the father-in-law had
deeded some property to the petitioner.
No mention was made, in either the 1930 or 1942 Board
rulings, of any limitations or restrictions on number of
employees, parking facilities, "family" involvement or
13
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occupation of the residence.

When the Board, in 1973,

enumerated such restrictions, it did so wholly without
foundation or legal basis.

The court below acknowledged

that the Board was imposing new restrictions.

(R.97)

Plaintiffs1 attorney correctly argued before the Board
of Adjustment in December, 1973, that "the current uses of
the property are a logical extension of the variances
granted and do not exceed the variance approved in 1942
wherein the property was used as a machine shop for the
making of tools."

(Exhibit 10-P)

He further argued, and

correctly so, that "there was no difference between the
running of the machine shop and the light manufacturing
and 'working on an antique car.'"
When Mr. Smith inspected the property in April, prior
to purchasing, he observed that the shop was being utilized
by a company which was assembling, painting and storing
light fixtures. The attached garage was occupied for
storage purposes by two dragster automobiles.

He observed

three or four individuals working in the machine shop.
(R.62-63)

That was the sum total of the "business" or shop

portion of the property.
In view of the liberal interpretations previously made
by the Board with respect to this property, the 1973 Board's
conclusion that the present uses were contrary to the spirit
and intent of the Zoning Ordinance was not only without
legal basis but totally inconsistent with the prior rulings.
14
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Mr. Johnson's statement and interpretation with regard
to the uses allowed under the variance has more legal basis,
is more logical and reasonable than the Board's subsequent
decision.
Plaintiffs' argument in the court below that defendant
misrepresented by stating that R-2 zoning permitted
duplexes is likewise without merit.

The letter from the

City Planning Director states that the Residential "R-2"
district zoning classification perraits two-family dwellings.
(Exhibit 20-P)

The testimony below disclosed that the

residence had been a duplex for at least 25 years and
probably longer.

(R.93) Apparently no permit had been

obtained at the time the residence was converted to a
duplex; however, that does not make it illegal.

The court

below stated defendant's position well when it said:
?The Court:
"If the zoning ordinance permits duplexes in that
area, how can the Citv complain they have a duplex
there?" (R.93)
* * *

"I suppose all the City could do if it could do
anything would be to complain about no building
permit having been issued and that would be a
personal matter and the statute of limitations would
have barred that by now." (R.94)
The following exchange between counsel and court further
disposed of the matter of the duplex:
r

Mr* Nielsen:

"And, in any event, if the Court please, . . . that
15
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building permit could be taken out any time by anybody
if it is a matter of a permit." (R.94)
The Court:
"I don't think it is too late. I don't think they
have to get a permit in that late of the day. It may
be unlawful to make certain changes in the building
without a permit, and they may make it a misdemeanor."
(R.94)
Mr. Dodd:
"They may turn out our tenants. . . . "
The Court:
"I think they have no right to do that."
Mr. Dodd:
"They did, though."
The Court:
"Did they do it?"
Mr. Nielsen:
"No, there is no testimony they did."
The Court:
"They ordered you to turn them out, didn't they?"
Mr. Dodd:
"Yes."
The Court:
"You didn't have to do it. Knowing you as well as I
do, I don't think you would do it just because somebody
tells you to." (R.94)
The court below admitted that it would like to be able
to reverse the decision of the Board of Adjustment. (R.118) The
court was not being asked to reverse the Board's decision.
16
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however.

It was the court's duty merely to decide whether

the statements made by defendant were false at the time
they were made.

In view of the foregoing arguments,

defendant submits that the court should have come to the
opposite conclusion.
C.

Variance Runs with the Land.

It appears to have been undisputed below that a
variance runs with the land*

(R.119,126)

The law is well

stated in 58 AM. JUR. , Zoning, §215:
"The right to make a non-conforming use of zoned
premises, under a grant of a variation for such
purpose, has been held not to be a mere personal
license or permit to the applicant or his assigns,
but to attach to the premises and to be available to
a subsequent purchaser thereof."
In accord are 168 ALR 122; Cohn v. County Board of
Supervisors, 135 Cal.2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (1955); State v.
Konopka, 119 Ohio App. 513, 200 N.E.2d 695 (1963).
Plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits which had
been established by the variance granted in 1930 as expanded
in 1942, and any representation to that effect was reasonable
and true.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS WERE ON NOTICE THAT THE SHOPS WERE BEING UTILIZED
PURSUANT TO VARIANCE AND NON-CONFORMING USE PERMIT AND
CONSEQUENTLY HAD A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO THE USE PRIOR TO
PURCHASE.
Mr. Smith testified that he was advised by Mr. Johnson
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that the shops were being operated pursuant to a 1945
non-conforming use permit which would be invalid if the
property was left vacant for one year and one day.

(Exhibit

11-D; R.25)
He also testified that he holds a masters degree in
public administration (R.42); that he has been employed
since 1966 primarily as an cissistant to city managers (R.42)
in Berkeley, El Cerrito, San Gabriel, Lindsay and Riverside,
all in California (R.42); that he was familiar with city
planning and the layout of a city (R.43); that he was aware
that cities had zoning rules and regulations (R.43); that
he was aware that certain sections of the city were zoned
for residential purposes as compared to commercial and other
purposes (R.44); that he was* aware that if a particular
area was zoned for one use, it couldn't be used for another
purpose unless there was some kind of a variance granted
(R.44); that he was entirely familiar with the terms
"variance" and "non-conforming use" at the time he talked
to Mr. Johnson on the phone (R.44) and that he knew that
if a person was using the property zoned for one use
inconsistent with that zoning regulation, it would have
to be pursuant to some variance or non-conforming use.
(R.44)
\ In spite of his familiarity with zoning, variances
and non-conforming use, Mr. Smith chose to ignore the
public records which were available to him, as well as to
Mr. Johnson.
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In view of the facts previously stated, however, it
is likely, had Mr. Smith examined the public record prior
to purchase, that he would have concluded, just as he
ultimately argued before the Board, that the present use
of the property was consistent with the variance(s) previously
granted.
This case is a good illustration of the policy of the
law and reasons behind the principles of law previously
stated, that representations as to what the law will or will
not permit, relating to rights in and to land, are expressions
of opinion, and even if they prove adverse to a subsequent
legal decision, will not establish prior fraud or form the
basis of recovery for false representation.
There is no testimony that Mr. Smith at any time asked
Mr. Johnson for a copy of the variance or the City's decisions
granting variance or that he asked Mr. Johnson to explain
the terms of the same
If anything is to be implied from Johnson's statements,
it would be that they were legal conclusions or legal
opinions such that would put Smith on notice, particularly
with his background in city administration, to determine the
legal significance of the non-conforming use himself.
In the case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d
273 (1952), this Court held that as to those things which
the vendee could find out for himself with reasonable
inquiry, he could not rely upon the representations of the
19
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vendor while there was nothing in the representations of
the vendor which precluded him from doing it.
The reasons generally advanced as the basis of the
rule that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations
as to matters of law are that everyone is presumed to know
the law, both civil and criminal, and is bound to take
notice of it, and therefore cannot, in legal contemplation,
be deceived by such representations.
§73.

37 AM. JUR. 2d, supra,

One has no right to rely on such representations or

opinions, and should not be permitted to say that he was
misled by them.
In

Scott v. Wilson, 15 111. App. 2d 456, 146 N.E.2d

397 (1957), the court held that:
"Even if the fact that a basement apartment in a building
was occupied by tenants and that rent was being collected
from it when the purchasers made an inspection prior to
purchasing the building constituted a representation by
conduct that such occupation was not in violation of a
city zoning ordinance, such representation would not
entitle the purchasers to rescission of the contract
after they were * equired to cease renting such basement
apartment because occupancy thereof was in violation
of the city zoning ordinance, since such representation
was a representation of law, and not of fact, and was
the type of representation concerning which both parties
had equal opportunity to inform themselves.
POINT III
BY TAKING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO BRING THE QUESTION OF USE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND BY FAILING TO APPEAL THE
DECISION OF THE BOARD, PLAINTIFFS RATIFIED ANY POSSIBLE
WRONG AND WAIVED ANY RIGHT THEY MAY HAVE HAD TO RESCISSION
AND DAMAGES.

%,
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In the court below plaintiffs' attorney posed the
question, "How far does a man have to go to pull himself
out of a situation. . . . "

(R.90)

The court responded by

saying:
"I would suspect that you would have to go farther
than just the Board of Adjustment. I think you would
have to go to court and get a decree of the court."
Plaintiffs' counsel stated that they "appealed to the
Board of Adjustment to see if the existing uses at the time
of the sale were permitted under the variance."

(R.135)

The time for rescission, if indeed plaintiffs were
entitled to that remedy, would have been in the first
instance after discovering the alleged wrong.

Once

plaintiffs undertook affirmative action before the Board,
however, they were bound to exhaust their remedies by appeal
before they could be entitled to rescind, particularly where
the facts of the case disclose that the Board's decision
was tenuous and on weak legal footings.
CONCISION
For the foregoiag reasons, Defendant and Appellant
respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
Randall L. Romrell
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD &
GOTTFREDSON
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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